trading on the volatility of spot power prices, in models where forward contracts are strategic tools used by energy producers to obtain profit security. We define volatility as the variance of the percentage change in spot power prices over a given time interval. As shown in Sapio (2008), volatility is related to stochastic fluctuations in preference and technology fundamentals, and is tuned by the price-elasticity of demand and supply, evaluated at equilibrium.
II. INTRODUCTION
n recent years, the traditional regulatory framework for the wholesale electricity industry has been replaced in many countries by market competition. Electricity producers compete through both spot market bidding and forward trading. Albeit electricity users and producers are faced with extremely high risk (Eydeland and (Allaz 1992) . Forward contracts can be used by power suppliers strategically, in order to increase their spot market share. But if suppliers are allowed to trade forward, they can use information more efficiently, and once their forward market commitments are signed, they are ready to compete more aggressively on the spot market, enhancing competition. In turn, greater spot competition is believed to decrease the likelihood of spikes and to yield lower spot volatility.
In this paper, we reappraise the spot volatility impact of forward trading, based on a simple insight. Lower spot prices induced by forward trading may correspond to a less elastic region of the demand function -e.g. when demand is linearpossibly leading to higher spot volatility. Moreover, low volatility may be achieved even in tightly oligopolistic markets without forward trading, if markups are kept rather stable.
We analyze the impact of forward trading on spot volatility in a Cournot oligopoly, comparing two cases: fixed and endogenous forward coverage. Our analysis builds on the paper by Allaz (1992) .
A forward contract is an agreement between two parties to buy or sell an asset at a pre-agreed future instant of time. Therefore, the trade date and delivery date are separated. They are used to control and hedge the market risk. If the transaction is collaterised, exchange of margin will take place according to a pre-agreed rule or schedule. Otherwise no asset of any kind actually changes hands, until the maturity of the contract. The forward price of such a contract is commonly contrasted with the spot price. The difference between the spot and the contract price is the contract premium or contract discount (Borgosz-Koczwara et al. 2007).
The paper is structured as follows. In Section III the spot volatility in models with fixed and endogenous and forward trading is analyzed. The results are illustrated by means of a simulation study.
III. MODELS WITH FORWARD TRADING

A. Fixed forward trading
The following analysis assumes symmetric Cournot competition in the spot electricity market, and lets the amount of forward contracts purchased by each of the n firms be fixed, or exogenously given, at the level f for individual firms, and at the market-wide level F = n f ≥ 0 (see Niu, Baldick and Zhu 2005) . Firms face an affine inverse demand function
Here, we assume that reservation prices, as measured by the intercept a(t), change over time, in response to events such as changes in weather, random shocks to preferences, and so forth. Conversely, we assume away any time variation in the slope of the demand function. Thus, for the sake of notational parsimony, we set the slope to 1.
Power generation companies are characterized by a linear cost function C(t) = c(t)q(t), where c(t) denotes the marginal cost of energy production, which is assumed constant across production levels, but variable over time. Indeed, this parameter captures the level of fuel costs, which fluctuate over time. Also, random shocks to the efficiency of power plants can give rise to fluctuations in c(t) (see also the Nomenclature section at the beginning of the paper).
Firms choose their output so as to maximize profits:
where A is the forward price. Taking account of all individual supply decisions, the expression for aggregate supply reads ( )
The market-clearing price is thus
As in Sapio (2008) , the variance of spot price rates of change reads ( )
Eq. (4) shows how the spot volatility depends on the volatility of fundamental drivers. Notice that, as n goes to infinity, the former (5) goes to zero and the latter (6) to 1. Hence, the spot price volatility approaches the volatility of marginal costs in a perfectly competitive market.
I B. Endogenous forward trading
The reference model here is Allaz (1992) , slightly extended to allow for uncertainty in marginal costs, in addition to the assumption of a random demand intercept as in the original model. We focus on the risk-neutral, Cournot conjectural variations case. The spot price implied by the Allaz model reads ( )
This result is obtained by substituting the expression for the amount of forward trading
(corresponding to Eq. 19 in Allaz 1992) into the spot price equation
under the assumption that producers are able to correctly guess the values of demand and cost parameters, using the information available up to time t-1:
with x(t) equal to either a(t) or c(t). Eq. (7) Here too, as n goes to infinity, the former elasticity (11) goes to zero, whereas the latter (12) goes to 1. Though, the volatility of spot prices with endogenous forward trading converges to the volatility of marginal costs faster than with fixed forwards, due to the terms in n squared.
C. The spot volatility impact of forward trading
As shown, the spot volatility does vary depending on whether forward coverage is fixed or endogenously determined, because the spot price responds in different ways to perturbations in cost and demand parameters. The information included in the previous sections can be useful in two respects. First, the results from the fixed forward model allow to study whether increasing the forward trading volume as such mitigates spot volatility. However, even beyond the impact of the sheer amount of forward trading, introducing forward contracts changes the behavior of electricity suppliers. As illustrated by the Allaz model, power producers can make strategic use of forward contracts, in order to improve their profit levels. Hence, a second goal of the analysis is to explore the issue of whether spot volatility is affected by the sequential strategies of electricity producers who trade both spot and forward. We pursue this goal by comparing the spot volatilities implied by fixed and endogenous forward trading models.
The relationship between spot volatility and the amount of forward trading is illustrated by (5) and (6), together with (4). Note that, because elasticities in (5) and (6) are increasing in F, forward trading increases the spot volatility by making the spot price more sensitive to fluctuations in both cost and demand parameters. This is because forwards lower the spot price level, corresponding to a less elastic region of the demand function, which is assumed linear. On these grounds, we conclude that if forward trading is fixed, then greater forward coverage increases spot volatility.
If the amount of forward trading is not fixed, suppliers can choose forward coverage strategically. To understand the impact of this, we wonder whether spot electricity markets with endogenous forward coverage are less volatile than with fixed forward trading. Formally, we ask whether
This is true if and only if The threshold value is the ratio between two measures of relative price responsiveness. At the numerator, there is the difference between how responsive is price to marginal costs in the endogenous forwards case, and how responsive it is under the fixed forwards case. These responsiveness indicators are both increasing in n, because spot prices in a more competitive market provide more information on the underlying marginal costs, and therefore respond more to cost fluctuations. The former increases faster with n (compare (6) and (12)).
At the denominator, there appears the relative responsiveness of price to the demand variable a, under fixed and endogenous forward trading. Both are decreasing with ni.e. higher when there is market power, because demand parameters enter the markups charged by suppliers. The latter decreases with n faster (compare (5) and (11)).
Condition (13) states that endogenous forward trading mitigates volatility more than fixed forward coverage, if the volatility of demand variables is greater than the volatility of marginal costs, according to a threshold value, dictated by the relative responsiveness of the price to the underlying demand and cost drivers.
Because price is more or less responsive to cost fluctuations depending on market power, it can be useful to assess how the impact of strategic trading on spot volatility is tuned by the strength of oligopolistic interactions and market power, which are inversely related to n. We thus study the behavior of Г with respect to the number of firms, n, all else being given, to answer the question: is the volatility impact of endogenous forward trading different under different degrees of market competition?
Intuitively, as the market approaches perfect competition (n→∞), the spot price p(t) tends to the value of marginal costs c(t), and accordingly, the spot price volatility tends to the volatility of production costs, V[γ(t)]. When producers are endowed with market power, instead, the spot price fluctuations depend also on the dynamics in the demand intercept a(t), in that decision-making by suppliers needs to incorporate information regarding how users would respond to price policies. Barring perfect competition, the spot volatility typically lies between the volatility of demand and cost parameters; see also (4) . Therefore, the spot market volatility can converge to the competitive value from "below" or from "above" as n→∞, depending on whether V[α(t)] or V[γ(t)] is larger. In markets with very stable production costs and noisy demand, competition drives volatility down. The opposite holds when demand is stable and costs vary wildly.
This given, the impact of endogenous forward trading vis-à-vis fixed forwards can be understood by noting that, as indicated in sections III.A and III.B, the spot volatility converges faster to the volatility of marginal costs with strategically-driven forward coverage. Hence, as n increases, endogenous forwards boost volatility more if V[γ(t)] is relatively large, but mitigate it more if V[γ(t)] is relatively small. One way or the other, the volatility value under endogenous forwards is closer to what is implied by an efficient market, than under fixed forwards, for all values of n. This is consistent with the idea that, if suppliers are allowed to choose the amount of forward coverage, as in the Allaz model, they can use information more efficiently. However, the volatility implied by a competitive market might be very large, if marginal costs are very noisy.
To formally assess this intuition, let us study how the threshold Г with respect to the number of firms n. Using (13), it is straightforward to verify that monopoly (n=1) is a sufficient condition for
This means that, if the market is fully concentrated, strategically-driven forward transactions are beneficial towards spot volatility reduction -consistent with Allaz (1992) .
What is the behavior at larger values of n? Suppose increasing n causes Г to increase. Then there may exist a value n* such that (13) is no longer satisfied for all n > n*. If so, allowing for endogenous forward trading in a market which is already rather competitive would actually make the spot market more volatile. Suppose instead that Г is decreasing in n. In such a case, endogenous forward trading is most beneficial for volatility, regardless of the degree of market competition. The condition (13) is however rather cumbersome. This is why we resort to a simulation methodology, as in the following section.
D. A simulation study
In order to illustrate the theoretical results obtained in the previous sections, we consider the symmetric Cournot competition in the spot electricity market with fixed and endogenous forward trading. By means of simulations, we illustrate the behavior of spot volatility and the Г coefficient with respect to n.
In our simulation study, we assume the sequences α(t) and γ(t) are i.i.d. random variables with standard normal distribution mutually independent. In this case the sequences a(t) and c(t) are independent random walks given by
In Fig. 1 we illustrate the prices p(t) for three values of n in case of fixed forward trading (top panel) as well as the endogenous forward trading (bottom panel). Moreover, on both panels the star lines represent the sequence c(t). It is worth pointing out that for a larger number of suppliers, the price tends to the marginal cost. In Fig. 2, 3 and 4 we show the behavior of spot price volatility for different numbers of suppliers in the two cases under consideration. As we see, for n=1 (the monopoly case) the volatility of spot prices in case of fixed forward trading exceeds the volatility in the endogenous forward case. This confirms the theoretical result obtained in section III.C. No clear ranking emerges between the fixed and the endogenous cases when n=2, whereas n=10 implies that strategically-driven forward transactions make the spot market relatively more unstable. In Fig. 5 we illustrate how the n parameter influences on the Г coefficient. As before, we consider three values: n=1, 2 and 10. The Г coefficient increases with respect to the number of suppliers, therefore the inequality given in (13) is less likely to hold for larger value of n. Thus, the parametrization used here The key is that endogenous forward trading pushes the price volatility closer to the volatility of marginal costs. But this may not be good news for the market, if marginal costs experience wide fluctuations.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have evaluated the price volatility in the Cournot model with fixed and endogenous forward trading, when suppliers use derivatives as components of their bidding strategies.
As we see in the theoretical analysis as well as in the simulation study, the considered forward contracts influence significantly the volatility. Moreover, the impact is tuned by the number of suppliers in the industry. Comparing the cases with fixed and endogenous forward coverage, one can observe that the price volatility may be magnified by endogenous forward trading in a symmetric Cournot model with linear demand: the reason is that forward trading pushes spot prices closer to marginal costs, corresponding to a less elastic region of the demand function.
We plan to extend our analysis to more realistic models, such as the Supply Function Equilibrium model. Indeed, the Cournot model is a simplification of the actual decisionmaking by power suppliers -whose strategies concern pricequantity pairs. The works by Newbery (1998), Green (1999) , and Borgosz-Koczwara and Wylomanska (2007) shall be the most useful starting points in that respect. Her area of interest are power system analysis, competitive electricity market, application of game theory to power market and time series analysis.
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